

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>Pers</i>		
2			
3			
4			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

Cy #6 Ser B

25X1

NSA review completed



25X3

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:




Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY-	USIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .



**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE**
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N0966
3 September 1981

The Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
The Capitol
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Some time ago an assessment was made within the Intelligence Community that a special overseas salary scale for certain overseas employees was needed. The need for this salary scale was based on the special nature of such overseas assignments, and the hardships and demands placed on individuals assigned to these overseas positions. As you know, the special class of cryptologic employees assigned overseas to [redacted], foreign liaison or foreign-liaison operational duties are included in this category and are compensated on the same basis as their CIA counterparts based on historical precedent, current integrated activities, and the unique nature of such assignments. 25X3

The special class of cryptologic personnel assigned overseas is engaged in duties that are significantly different from the normal NSA overseas assignments. Individuals are generally assigned to facilities that do not possess the broad range of medical, educational, cultural, social, and other services available at large military or civilian collection facilities located in the more benign environments that normally house our overseas operations. Individuals are often required to assume [redacted] lower graded positions than those the individuals actually hold. Thus, they are not generally able to integrate themselves into the small local community at the level they would otherwise be able to at a normal overseas post. The facilities to which they are assigned are often [redacted] 25X3

UNCODED [redacted] there are few local commercial, educational, and cultural support facilities. Although one can identify [redacted] facilities that may be viewed as desirable, the vast majority are viewed as undesirable or tolerable at best. 25X3

The jobs these individuals perform require a variety of [redacted] UNCODED 25X3
together with a dedication to duty and a willingness to endure long [redacted] 25X1

SECRET

25X3
CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
REVIEW ON 1 Sept 2011

SECRET

Serial: N0966

hours, poor or crowded working conditions, and little or no backup. Opportunities for medical and recreational leave are limited. In the event of crises, individuals may be subject to even more extended hours and workloads without relief and may be required to assume exceptionally significant responsibilities. Many of these positions, because of their unique requirements, do not afford the same career opportunities that are available to other Agency employees. For the same reason individuals who remain in such jobs are subject to more frequent relocation than average employees because virtually all such positions are located overseas. Although the special class of cryptologic personnel do or will receive benefits and allowances commensurate with those received by CIA employees, they do not receive the same early retirement benefits available to those employees despite being subject to the same or similar frequent overseas assignment.

There are serious problems in currently staffing a number of these positions despite the added benefits and allowances available. These problems are basically the result of the hardships experienced at such posts, the family dislocations that result, the lack of available commercial, medical, educational, social, and cultural activities, the high cost of overseas living, the heavy workload, the poor environmental conditions, and similar factors.

In the past, NSA has attempted to deal with these problems on a case-by-case basis using existing temporary promotion authority, a long standing and well accepted practice. When the CIA assessment was made, NSA was prepared to adopt the same overseas salary schedule which would have been used in lieu of the temporary promotion procedure except where extreme hardship dictated extraordinary measures. We have not exercised this pay setting authority in the past. Instead we have maintained a single salary schedule for all employees and have provided special benefits and allowances or appropriate position classification for specific duties based on assigned responsibilities, need, and hardship. Your Committee and the House Appropriations Committee have been most helpful in providing legislative authority to pay appropriate benefits and allowances to this special class, and this support has been very much appreciated.

However, we have been advised by your staff and CIA that the salary schedule has been withdrawn subject to a study to be completed and delivered to you by February 1982. In the interim, the CIA has initiated temporary compensation based on its special authorities that is neither pay nor a benefit or allowance. NSA's authority is limited to that necessary to set a pay scale or pay a benefit or allowance. Thus, the only other alternative available to NSA pending completion of the pay study would be to provide individuals

SECRET

SECRET

Serial: N0966

in the special class with a temporary promotion. We have determined that this could result in some individuals receiving less than a 9% increase while others could receive as much as a 20% increase (where they are in the first step of one grade and are advanced to the first step of the next grade, i.e., GS-7.1 to GS-9.1). This would create new inequities which are equally unacceptable. In view of these inequities, we will accede to the Committee's expressed desire that we defer action on any across-the-board increase until completion of the February 1982 study. We have contacted the DCI and will participate in their study. In the interim we will continue to use temporary promotions to resolve hardship cases and difficult staffing situations on a case-by-case basis.

We must emphasize that this places us in an extremely difficult situation with respect to our personnel who have been assigned to these positions. They were recruited for these positions with the understanding that they would receive compensation comparable to that provided their CIA counterparts since this has been past practice. They are very aware of the fact that their CIA counterparts are receiving increased compensation while they are not. This has adversely affected employee morale and will have an impact on future recruiting. We hope that the Committee will carefully consider its actions in this area and provide us with the necessary authorization to treat these employees fairly and equitably. It is essential, in view of the heavy burdens, hardship and responsibilities borne by these individuals, that they receive compensation and support at least equal to that received by their counterparts. It is equally essential that NSA not be denied the flexibility needed to recruit and staff these difficult positions. We hope that you and your Committee will continue your excellent record of support in meeting these important national security needs. We will continue to work closely with you to meet this shared goal.

Sincerely,



LINCOLN D. FAURER
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:
DCI

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
--------------	--------------	--------

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO: *Leis*

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	D/DCI/CT				
6	DD/A		X		
7	DD/O		X		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		X		
13	D/PA				
14	D/EE0				
15	D/PPPM				
16	AO/DCI				
17	PB/NSC				
18	D/ICS		X		
19	D/Perf.		X		
20	C/AS/OP		X		
21					
22					

Free

001

SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

Remarks:

Note: Same letter sent to
Chairman, SSC1.

Executive Secretary
8 September 1981

Date

1 - DAYS